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ST. JOHN'S LAW 'REVIEW
accepted as being unlawful, he should not be afforded the benefit
of having a plaintiff's complaint dismissed for failure to plead
special damages.
ARTICLE 3- JURISDICTION AND SERVICE, APPEARANCE
AND CHOICE OF COURT
CPLR 302: British long-arm statute given local effect.
Defendant, a New York corporation, appointed plaintiff its
exclusive concessionaire in the United Kingdom to sell defendant's
product under a contract which stipulated that it was to be gov-
erned by the laws of Englana. In an action for breach of contract,
brought in Great Britain, the defendant was personally served in
New York pursuant to the British long-arm statute.48 Upon de-
fendant's failure to appear, a default judgment was rendered against
him. In Plugmay Ltd. v. National Dynamics Corp.,4 9 plaintiff brought
suit in New York on the English judgment. In rejecting the
defendant's contention that the British court had no jurisdiction
over it, the New York court, although not bound to do so,50 upheld
the British judgment. The court noted that CPLR 302 makes a
nonresident of New York subject to its jurisdiction when a "single
act" takes place in this state, and added that "if the facts were
the reverse, this court would have taken jurisdiction of the English
defendant by extraterritorial service .... We can do no less now
in affording the English court reciprocal acquisition of jurisdiction
over the defendant here. It has the support of our present public
policy." 51
CPLR 302(a): Allegations in complaint held sufficient to sustain
jurisdiction.
Saratoga Harness Racing Ass'n v. Moss 52 involved an action
for damages resulting from an illegal boycott of horse races con-
ducted by the plaintiff, and a tortious interference with the plain-
tiffts contracts with certain owners and trainers of horses. The
tort was alleged to have been committed in New York by the de-
fendants who were non-domiciliaries. The court sustained juris-
diction over the defendants under CPLR 302 (a) (2) since the alle-
gations in the complaint stated a valid cause of action and a basis
for in personam jurisdiction.
48 Supreme Court of Judicature, Order 11, rule 1(f)iii, (g).
-9 48 Misc. 2d 913, 266 N.Y.S.2d 240 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1966).
50 It should be noted that principles of comity, and not full faith and
credit, apply to judgments of the courts of foreign countries. Thus, our
courts are not bound to give effect to such judgments, but mnay do so in
their discretion.
51 Plugmay Ltd. v. National Dynamics Corp., 48 Misc. 2d 913, 917, 266
N.Y.S.2d 240, 244-45 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct 1966).
52 49 Misc. 2d 855, 268 N.Y.S.2d 619 (Sup. Ct. Saratoga County 1966).
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It appears, however, that prior to the court's decision, it ne-
glected to require a hearing to establish the truthfulness of the plain-
tiff's allegations. It would appear that such a hearing should be
held in order to protect nonresident defendants over whom New
York seeks to assert personal jurisdiction. In this way, a non-
resident defendant would not be forced, by virtue of a mere allega-
tion, to defend an action for which there is no jurisdictional basis.
A better statement of the law is found in Buckley v. Redi-
Bolt, Inc.,53 and Vernon v. Rock-Ledge House, Inc.54 In Buckley,
the plaintiff brought an action for damages for personal injuries
sustained in the collapse of a ski lift. The plaintiff alleged that
the accident was caused by certain "defective bolts" which were
manufactured by defendant, a foreign corporation, and sold by it
in New York. The court determined that the defendant had in
fact employed a salesman in New York, and had solicited business
here by means of catalogs and advertisements. The court con-
cluded, therefore, that the defendant had "transacted business" "
in New York and was subject to personal jurisdiction. In answer
to the defendant's contention that the plaintiff did not show that
his cause of action arose from any purposeful activity engaged in
by the defendant in New York, the court stated that in deciding
the question of jurisdiction "it is not required . . . to establish de-
fendant's responsibility by the same degree of proof required upon
the trial of the action. . . . Enough has been shown to indicate
the existence of a controversy which, if resolved in plaintiff's favor
•6 * .would warrant the assumption of jurisdiction under CPLR
302(a) (1)." "0
In Vernon, the plaintiff, a minority stockholder in defendant
Rock-Ledge House, a New York corporation, sued for an account-
ing of funds paid by it to defendant Rutgers Construction Company,
a New Jersey corporation. The action was based on an alleged
waste of corporate assets, and jurisdiction over defendant Rutgers
was sought by means of CPLR 302. The court entertained juris-
diction since it was determined by a special referee that payments
had been made by Rock-Ledge to Rutgers. These acts were held
to be sufficient to satisfy both CPLR 302(a) (1) and (2) since the
alleged wasting of corporate assets was not only a tort but also a
transaction of business in New York by defendant Rutgers.
The court was careful to note that the present disposition was
solely with regard to the question of jurisdiction. Thus it held
that where it is necessary that the determination of jurisdiction
53 49 Misc. 2d 864, 268 N.Y.S.2d 653 (Sup. Ct. Rensselaer County 1966).
54 49 Misc. 2d 98, 266 N.Y.S.2d 556 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1966).
55 CPLR 302 (a) (1).
50 Buckley v. Redi-Bolt, Inc., 49 Misc. 2d 864, 268 N.Y.S.2d 653, 657-58
(Sup. Ct. Rensselaer County 1966).
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include an inquiry into the merits, 57 this inquiry is limited to
whether the alleged acts, out of which the cause of action has
arisen, have been committed, and may not include a determination
of whether those acts were wrongful.
CPLR 302(a)f1): Constitutional limit not reached.
While New York's long-arm statute, CPLR 302, has greatly
increased the power of New York courts to exercise in personam
jurisdiction over non-domiciliaries, a question has arisen as to
whether CPLR 302 has gone as far as is constitutionally permissible:
CPLR 302(a) (1) gives personal jurisdiction over non-domi-
ciliaries who have "transacted business" in New York, out of
which transaction a cause of action has arisen. The courts have
been liberal in applying this section in commercial cases.-5  This
is contrasted with the restricted application of CPLR 302(a) (2)
in tort cases.59 A recent case, however, gives some indication that
CPLR 302 (a) (1) does not reach the permissible limit of in per-
sonam jurisdiction.
In Kramer v. Vogl,60 plaintiff sought fraud damages. The
defendants, Austrian firms, had contracted to give the plaintiff the
exclusive right l to sell the defendants' product in the United
States. The contract was consummated in Paris and a letter con-
firming the exclusive sales agreement was sent to the plaintiff's
office in New York. The defendants did not engage in sales, pro-
5 Since jurisdiction under CPLR 302 depends upon the commission of
certain acts within New York by the non-domiciliary defendant, a court
deciding the issue of jurisdiction must make determinations on the merits,
i.e., whether the defendant transacted business in New York (CPLR
302(a) (1)), or committed a tortious act within the state (CPLR 302(a) (2)),
or owned or possessed property in New York out of which the action arose(CPLR 302(a) (3)). Any determination on the merits made by a court
concerned solely with jurisdiction, however, is not binding on the court trying
the merits. E.g., Vernon v. Rock-Ledge House, Inc., 49 Misc. 2d 98, 266
N.Y.S.2d 556 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1966); Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill. 2d 378,
143 N.E.2d 673 (1957).58 E.g., Lewin v. Boch Laundry Mach. Co., 16 N.Y2d 1070, 213 N.E.2d
686, 266 N.Y.S.2d 391 (1966); Johnson v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y,
16 N.Y.2d 1067, 213 N.E.2d 466, 266 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1966); Singer v. Walker,
15 N.Y2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 905
(1965).
59 Since the decision of Feathers v. McLucas, there has been no doubt
that CPLR 302(a) (2), dealing with the commission of a "tortious act,"
does not approach the constitutional limit. In that case, the Court of Appeals
held that the language of that subsection clearly precluded its applicability
to any case wherein the act which produced the injury in New York was
committed outside the state. Feathers v. McLucas, 15 N.Y.2d 443, 460,
209 N.E.2d 68, 77, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, 21 (1965).6o 17 N.Y2d 27, 215 N.E2d 159, 267 N.Y.S.2d 900 (1966).
61 An exception was made in the contract for one named customer. Id.
at 29-30, 215 N.E.2d at 160, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 902.
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